It appearing to the Commission that the allegations of the Unfair Practice Charge, if true, may constitute unfair practices within the meaning of the Act, a Complaint and Notice of Hearing was issued on March 17, 1980. ^2/ By answer filed on March 26, 1980, the Respondent denied the allegations of unfair practice and set forth affirmative defenses with respect to the charge. Essentially, the Respondent argued that the charge failed to state a cause of action, and that the Charging Party = s claim was a result of actions by a third party (Local 194, IFPTE) over which the Authority had no control, and which was not jointed as a party to this action.

Pursuant to the Complaint and Notice of Hearing, hearings were held in this matter on May 20, 21, 22, and 28, 1980, in Trenton, New Jersey, at which time the parties were given an opportunity to examine witnesses, to present relevant evidence and to argue orally. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs the last of which was received by July 24, 1980, on August 4, 1980.

An Unfair Practice Charge having been filed with the Commission, a question concerning alleged violations of the Act exists, and after hearing and after consideration of the post- hearing briefs of the parties, the matter is appropriately before the Commission by its designated Hearing Examiner for determina- tion.

Upon the entire record the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

employer within the meaning of the Act and is subject to its provisions.

2. Jeffrey Beall was a public employee within the

meaning of the Act at the time of his employment with the Authority and was terminated therefrom on December 27, 1977.

3. The New Jersey Turnpike Employees Union, Local

194, I.F.P.T.E., AFL-CIO ( A Local 194") is an employee representa- tive within the meaning of the Act, and was a party to a collective negotiations agreement effective June 27, 1977 (Exhibit J-1) with the Authority covering toll collection and maintenance employees which included the Charging Party = s title.

4. After his termination from the Authority in

December 1977, the Charging Party filed a grievance concerning that action which was processed through the grievance procedure as set forth in Articles XVI and XVII of the collective agree- ment. Article XVII(B) provides for a hearing by the Deputy Executive Director (or the Personnel Director) of the Authority in matters constituting Administrative discipline such as in the instant case. Such a hearing was held on January 18, 1978 regarding the Charging Party = s termination and the same was up- held. The hearing officer found that the Charging Party had failed to report to work on his regular work day of December 26, 1977 and that he failed to notify the Authority of the reasons for his absence. Local 194 represented the Charging Party at that hearing and Mr. Beall testified that he was operating under his old work schedule which did not have him scheduled to work on December 26, 1977. ^3/

The hearing officer, however, found that based upon the December incident, as well as previous incidents, the dismissal of the Charging Party was warranted. The other incidents of primary importance that were referred to included an unauthorized leave of absence by the Charging Party on August 5, 1977. Mr. Beall admitted his mistake in that matter and voluntarily accepted a five (5) day suspension. ^4/ The other incident referred to occurred on October 8, 1977 and included a charge of unauthorized leave, possession of alcoholic beverages while on duty, and abuse of sick leave. The Charging Party was originally given a 40 day suspension for that incident, but after a hearing on the matter at which he was represented by Local 194, the suspension was reduced to 15 days. Arbitration was not requested in that matter and the 15 day suspension was served. ^5/

5. After the hearing on his dismissal, the Charging

Party requested that Local 194 pursue the matter to arbitration. Since that request came shortly before the end of the period to file for arbitration, Local 194 could only conduct a telephone vote of the Executive Board to determine whether arbitration should be granted. ^6/ The Executive Board voted overwhelmingly against taking the Charging Party = s grievance to arbitration, and the Charging Party did not appeal that decision, although he could have, to the union membership as a whole. ^7/ The Charging Party had, through his attorney, Thomas Foy, advised Local 194 of his willingness to pay the cost of arbitration and represent himself. Members of the Executive Board, however, did not believe that money was the controlling factor in denying the Charging Party = s request for arbitration, rather, they believed that his grievance did not have a reasonable chance of success. ^8/ Since Local 194 did not take the Charging Party = s grievance to arbitration, the Authority believed it was under no obligation to the Charging Party to agree to arbitrate the grievance at the Charging Party = s expense.^9/ The Charging Party alleged that Local 194 failed to fairly represent him at his hearing of January 18, 1978 by inadequately investigating the circumstances leading up to his discharge, as well as the other incidents referred to herein. In addition, the Charging Party alleged that the Executive Board = s decision refusing to request arbitration resulted from a reliance upon insufficient information which demonstrated a failure of its fair representation duty.

6. The Charging Party argued that his dismissal

occurred, at least in part, because of harassment directed at him by supervisors of the Authority. The facts showed that in 1974 the Charging Party witnessed Supervisor Joseph Fabrizi stealing dirt from the Authority and reported him for that action. Fabrizi was subsequently disciplined because of the incident. ^10/ Several people in the Charging Party = s work location knew that he had reported a supervisor,^11/ yet it was also clear that many people, although award of the A Fabrizi incident @ were unaware of who actually reported him. ^12/ The Charging Party testified that after the Fabrizi incident his troubles began, he was treated differently and watched by the supervisors. ^13/ Nevertheless, he admitted that he was watched by supervisors before and after the Fabrizi incident. ^14/ Finally, although the Charging Party main-

tained that he was treated differently by supervisors after the Fabrizi incident, two supervisors, Jim Colby and Joseph Hornblower testified that they did not discriminate against the Charging Party. ^15/

7. The Charging Party also argued that the Authority

and Local 194 by their actions in combination with one another had deprived him of his right to pursue his grievance to arbitration. In his opening remarks at the hearing the Charging Party = s attorney maintained that the Authority and Local 194 to- gether acted in a way to deprive the Charging Party of his rights guaranteed by the Act. ^16/ In fact, the Charging Party = s attorney

maintained in his post-hearing brief:

A that the Authority exerted improper influence on
Local 194 not to take the Charging Party = s case

to arbitration and Local 194 acceeded to such
pressure. @

Despite the above assertion, the record is devoid of any evidence that would establish a collusive relationship between the Authority and Local 194. There was no evidence of a conspiracy or of a secret agreement between the Authority and Local 194 to deprive the Charging Party of his rights, and there was no evidence to support the allegation that the Authority exerted influence over Local 194 not to take the Charging Party = s grievance to arbitration. The Charging Party had the opportunity to examine officials of both the Authority and Local 194 at the hearing but could not elicit any testimony even hinting of an attempt by the Authority to influence Local 194's actions. The undersigned credits the testimony of the union officials who stated that the reason the Charging Party = s grievance was not sent to arbitration was because there was little likelihood for success. ^17/

8. The Commission in In re New Jersey Turnpike

Authority, P.E.R.C. No. 80-106, 6 NJPER 106 (& 11055 1980), ordered the issuance of a complaint in this matter but did not rule upon the merits of the charge. With respect to the alleged (a)(5) violation of the Act, the Commission held that the statute of limitations period applied against Local 194,

A ...would not prevent the Charging Party from
putting on proofs of a breach of Local 194's duty

of fair representation as a means of establishing
the Authority = s violation of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4
(a)(5) @ at slip op p. 6.

With respect to the alleged (a)(1) violation of the Act, the Commission acknowledged that an employer = s refusal to hear a grievance filed by an individual arguably could amount to inter- ference, restraint or coercion of employee rights.

9. At the close of the Charging Party = s case the

Respondent made a motion on the record to dismiss the complaint in its entirety arguing that the Charging Party failed to establish a violation of the Act. The undersigned reserved judgement on the motion to dismiss and permitted the Respondent to present its case. The Respondent completed its case at the same hearing and the entire hearing in this matter was concluded that day. The undersigned, therefore, will consider the merits of the motion to dismiss based upon all of the evidence in this case and reach a conclusion on the motion to dismiss merged with that of the decision on the entire record.

Collusion and Local 194's Alleged
Failure of Fair Representation

The Charging Party alleged that the Authority violated the Act by putting pressure on Local 194 to deny the Charging Party = s request for arbitration. Therefore, the Charging Party believed that by proving that Local 194 failed in its duty of fair representation he could establish a collusive relationship between the Authority and the union to deny him his rights under the Act. The undersigned has previously found, however, that there was insufficient evidence of a collusive relationship, and no basis upon which to attack the veracity of the union officials who testified that they denied arbitration because the grievance lacked the likelihood of success. ^19/

Despite a finding that no collusion existed between the Authority and Local 194, the Charging Party raised certain issues with respect to the union = s duty of fair representation which needs to be considered herein. The Charging Party made a common mistake in attacking Local 194's refusal to request arbitration. It is a well settled labor law principle that a union, acting in good faith, does not violate the law by refusing to process a grievance to arbitration. The United States Supreme Court established that principle in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190- 191, 64 LRRM 2369, 2377 (1967), when it said:

A Though we accept the proposition that a union
may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance

or process it in a perfunctory fashion, we do not
agree that the individual employee has an absolute
right to have his grievance taken to arbitration
regardless of the provisions of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement. @

The Court also said:

A The breach of the statutory duty of fair represen-
tation occurs only when a union = s conduct toward
a member of the...unit is arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or in bad faith. 64 LRRM at 2376.

The Federal Courts and the National Labor Relations Board have interpreted A arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith @ to mean something more than mere negligence, rather, there must be a showing of personal hostility. In Teamsters Local 692 (Great Western Unifreight), 209 NLRB 446, 85 LRRM 1385 (1975), the Board held that negligent union action or inaction by itself would not be considered arbitrary, irrelevant, invidious, or a breach of the duty of fair representation. The courts have expanded on this principle and held that proof that a union acted negligently or provided poor quality representation does not support a violation of fair representation even if the grievance is later found to be meritorious. Bazarte v. United Transportation Union, 429 F.2d 868, 75 LRRM 2017 (3d Cir. 1970), Encina v. Luma Boot Co. Inc., 316 F. Supp . 239, 75 LRRM 2012, aff = d. 448 F.2d 1264, 78 LRRM 2382 (1971).

The Charging Party argued herein that Local 194's failure to thoroughly investigate the facts leading to his dis- charge demonstrated a failure of the duty of fair representation. Absent any showing of personal hostility, however, the courts do not support that contention. In a case on point, Berry v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., (DC NM) 85 LRRM 2408 (1974), a union representative neither conducted an investigation or interviewed witnesses, failed to introduce relevant material at the hearing, and, the hearing only lasted 15 minutes. Neverthe- less, the court found that absent a showing of malice or personal hostility, a union = s failure to investigate facts and collect evidence or interview witnesses does not constitute bad faith. Finally, the United States Supreme Court held that to establish a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation,

A ...carries with it the need to adduce substantial
evidence of discrimination that is intentional,

severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objec-
tives. @ ^20/

This Commission and the New Jersey Courts have frequently relied upon Federal policy including court and N.L.R.B. decisions in formulating its own labor policy. See Lullo v. International Assoc. of Firefighters, 55 N.J . 409 (1970). In fact, in Belen v. Woodbridge Twp., 142 N.J. Super . 486, 490-491 (App. Div. 1976), the court held that the duty of fair representation as developed under the National Labor Relations Act was an appropriate guide for interpreting our Act.

In In re New Jersey Turnpike Employees Union, Local 194 IFPTE , P.E.R.C. No. 80-38, 5 NJPER 412 ( & 10215 1979), the Commission considered a case similar to the instant matter and held that,

A ...the union was not obligated to provide
unsurpassable representation, but such

representation as would adequately protect
those interests of the grievant which could
be adversely affected. @ At slip. op. p. 5.

The Commission identified the principles of a union = s duty of fair representation and held,

A The union must exercise reasonable care and
diligence in investigating, processing and

presenting grievances; it must make a good
faith judgement in determining the merits of
the grievance; and, it must treat individuals
equally by granting equal access to the
grievance procedure and arbitration for
similar grievances of equal merit. At slip.
op. pp. 3-4.

In the instant matter, Local 194 met the above criteria. Although the union did not investigate the facts of the concluded August and October incidents, it did review the facts of the December incident, it made a good faith attempt at processing the grievance and representing the Charging Party at the January hearing, and it decided not to proceed to arbitration based upon a good faith belief that the grievance lacked merit.

From the totality of the evidence presented, and based upon the cited decisions, the undersigned finds that Local 194 was not in collusion with the Authority to deny the Charging Party of his rights, and it did not violate its duty of fair representation in refusing to process his grievance to arbitration. Since the union did not violate the Act with respect to the Charging Party = s rights, the Authority could not have violated Section a(5) of the Act. In order to have found that the Authority in this case A refused to process a grievance presented by the majority representative @ there had to be a finding that Local 194 requested arbitration, or unlawfully failed to request arbitration. No such finding was made herein. Local 194 did present the Charging Party = s grievance through the grievance procedure but decided in good faith not to request arbitration. The Authority properly processed the grievance through the lower steps of the grievance procedure, but absent collusion with or a violation by Local 194, the Authority did not violate Section a(5) by refusing the Charging Party = s request for arbitration because that request was made by the majority representative.

The Authority = s Alleged Interference And Its

Refusal To Proceed To Arbitration

Having found that there was no collusion between the Authority and Local 194, the Charging Party could only establish a violation of the Act under Section (a)(1) by proving that the Authority interfered with or harassed him, discharged him in violation of his contractual rights, or denied him the right to present his grievance.

Regarding the first two allegations, the Charging Party relied upon the facts of the Fabrizi incident and argued that he was harassed by various supervisors of the Authority because of what he had done to Fabrizi. However, the facts do not establish harassment or interference by supervisors of the Authority against the Charging Party nor do they prove that the Charging Party was discharged in violation of any of his rights. The Fabrizi incident occurred in 1974, yet the three primary incidents that the Charging Party was involved with that led to his discharge occurred in 1977. The timing is not close. It is unreasonable to conclude that supervisors would wait that long to A harass @ the Charging Party. Moreover, the facts of each incident demonstrate that the Charging Party had a poor work attitude and he showed very little willingness to improve the same. The Charging Party attempted to build a case of harassment at hearing, yet, there was no proof of any personal animosity directed toward the Charging Party and there was no substantial proof that the Charging Party was treated differently than other employees. Although the Charging Party testified that he believed that he was being harassed, the evidence does not support such a conclusion. The undersigned credits the testimony of the supervisors and the superintendent of maintenance concerning the Charging Party = s attitude and the three 1977 incidents. Therefore, the undersigned finds that the Charging Party was not harassed by the Authority nor discharged in violation of any contractual right.

Regarding the allegation that the Authority denied the Charging Party the right to present his grievance, the under- signed concludes that the Authority did not violate the Act or the State Constitution by refusing the Charging Party = s request for arbitration after Local 194 had declined to pursue the matter to that level.

Article I, paragraph 19 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 provides in pertinent part:

A ...Persons in public employment shall have the
right to organize, present to and make known

to the State, or any of its political subdivi-
sions or agencies, their grievances and prop-
sals through representatives of their own
choosing. @

Our Act provides at N.J.S.A . 34:13A-5.3:

A Public employers shall negotiate written policies
setting forth grievance procedures by means of
which their employees or representatives of em-
ployees may appeal the interpretation, applica-
tion or violation of policies, agreements, and
administrative decisions affecting them pro-
vided that such grievance procedures shall be
included in any agreement entered into between
the public employer and the representative
organization. Such grievance procedures may
provide for binding arbitration as a means for
resolving disputes. @

Neither the Constitution nor the Act require that an employee have an absolute right to pursue a grievance to binding arbitration. The Act says only that a grievance procedure may provide for binding arbitration, not that the public employee is required to permit individual employees to request arbitration in the absence of the majority representative. ^21/

In the instant matter the Charging Party clearly presented his grievance to the public employer through Local 194 and in fact a hearing was held concerning that grievance. The Charging Party is actually arguing that he had a right, acting without the union, to pursue his grievance to arbitration, but the law does not support that contention. In Red Bank Reg. Ed. Assoc. v. Red Bank Reg. H.S. Bd of Ed., 78 N.J . 122 (1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a majority representative of a unit of employees is:

A (Their sole representative within the meaning of
Art. I, para. 19 for purposes of presentation

of their grievances to their public employer. @
78 N.J. at 135.

The Court further indicated that once an employee elects to have his grievance presented through his majority representative it is no longer viewed as solely his grievance. ^22/ Finally, the Court held that it is not an unfair practice for a public employer to refuse to process a grievance presented by an individual once the primary responsibility for presenting the grievance has been entrusted to a majority representative. ^23/

Although Red Bank did not specifically discuss the right to pursue a grievance to arbitration, it is difficult to believe that the Court would find that the majority representa- tive controls the presentation of grievances and then not extend that same rationale to the request for arbitration.

In Vaca v. Sipes , supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle that:

A (If an individual employee could compel arbitration
of his grievance regardless of its merit, the

settlement machinery provided by the contract would
be substantially undermined... @ 64 LRRM at 2377.

Based upon an examination of Red Bank , supra , the above principle is equally applicable in New Jersey. If each unit member were permitted to pursue grievances to arbitration despite the majority representative = s good faith refusal to do the same, it would seriously undermine the collective negotiations process, and actually subject the public employer to a negotiations process with each individual employee. That certainly was not the Legislature = s intent in the passage of our Act.

Having found that no collusion existed between the Authority and Local 194, and that no evidence of an independent Section (a)(1) violation existed, the undersigned finds that the Authority was under no obligation to permit the Charging Party, without the majority representative, to present his grievance to binding arbitration.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Charging Party failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that representatives of the Authority harassed him, or that the Authority interfered with the processing of his grievance, or unlawfully prevented him from presenting his grievance, or dis- charged him in violation of his contractual rights.

Upon the foregoing, and upon the entire record in this case, the Hearing Examiner makes the following:

Arnold H. Zudick

Hearing Examiner

DATED: September 8, 1980
Trenton, New Jersey







1/ These subsections prohibit employers, their representatives and agents from: A (1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by this Act. (5) Refusing to negotiate in good faith with a majority representative of employees in an appropriate unit concerning terms and conditions of employ- ment of employees in that unit, or refusing to process grievances presented by the majority representative. @
2/ This charge was originally filed against the Authority and Local 194, IFPTE alleging that both the Authority and Local 194 interfered with the Charging Party = s contractual rights. Subsequently, in In re New Jersey Turnpike Authority D.U.P. No. 80-10, 5 NJPER 518 ( & 10268 1979), the Director of Unfair practices refused to issue a complaint in this matter with respect to the entire Charge. The Charging Party appealed that decision to the Commission and in In re New Jersey Turnpike Authority, P.E.R.C. No. 80-106, 6 NJPER 106 (& 11055 1980), the Commission affirmed the Director = s refusal to issue complaint concerning alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(2), (3) and (4) and (b)(1) and (5), but directed that a complaint issue with respect to the alleged violations of N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(a)(1) and (5) against the Authority. Since a complaint was not issued against Local 194, the instant matter concerns only those (a)(1) and (5) allegations with respect to the Authority. The Commission in its decision set forth the reasons for the issuance of a complaint and established guidelines to be used in reviewing the evidence brought forth in this matter. The Commission, however, did uphold the Director = s finding that the instant charge was timely filed in that it was first filed with the Superior Court in April 1978, and officially transferred by the Court to the Commission by order dated September 18, 1978.
3/ Transcript (T) I, p. 74.
4/ The Charging Party testified that there was a meeting which he attended between Local 194 and the Authority concerning his August incident. The Charging Party was accompanied by Shop Steward Sinclair (T. II, p. 76), and admitted that at the meeting he signed a statement admitting his guilt over that incident (T. II, p. 36), that he signed the document on his own (T. II, p. 38), and that he accepted the five day suspension and did not want to challenge it further (T. I, p. 59).
5/ The facts of the October incident show that a hearing was conducted on October 20, 1977 before the Deputy Executive Director of the Authority concerning the incident. The Charging Party was present and was represented by officials of Local 194. On October 24, 1977 the Deputy Executive Director issued his decision reducing the suspension from 40 to 15 days. The Charging Party admitted that he accepted the 15 day suspension and did not attempt to appeal. (T. I, pp. 59-60; T. II, pp. 42-43).

However, the Charging Party testified that he was not given a chance to testify or state his side of the case (T. II, p. 43). When pressed further, the Charging party admitted that he was given a chance to make a statement and that nobody cut his off (T. II, pp. 43-44). The Charging Party felt that since nobody asked him questions he was denied the right to give his side of the story. The undersigned, however, cannot credit that testimony. It is unreasonable to believe that the Charging Party was denied a chance to give his side of what occurred after admitting that he made a statement and that nobody cut him off. In fact, the record shows that the Charging Party = s statement was a decisive factor in the Deputy Executive Director = s decision to reduce the 40 day suspension (T. IV, pp. 197-198). See also Exhibit R-7.

The undersigned also credits the testimony of Richard Zuccaro, a former member of Local 194's Executive Board, when he testified that the Charging Party was not placed on the witness stand at the October hearing because the union officials believed he was under the influence of alcohol (T. IV, p. 108). Mr. Zuccaro testified that he thought he could do better by not placing the Charging Party on the stand and that he gave the Charging Party the option. (T. IV. p. 109).
6/ Article XVII(B) provides:
A All requests for binding arbitration shall be filed
withing ten working days after receipt of the decision
of the Executive Director.@

The record shows that the Executive Director = s letter sustaining the hearing officer = s termination of the Charging Party was dated February 8, 1978 and was sent to the Charging party and Local 194. See Exhibit CP-5. By letter dated February 13, 1978, the Charging Party asked Local 194 to request arbitration (Exhibit CP-9). Apparently, on February 16, 1978 the Charging Party = s attorney, Mr. Foy, telephoned Local 194 and learned that Mr. Beall = s letter had not arrived, and he therefore advised Business Manager Jack Ford of the request for arbitration and confirmed the same by a letter dated the same date. See Exhibit CP-9). Local 194 did not have a meeting of the Union Executive Board scheduled within the remaining time to request arbitration. Therefore, a telephone poll of the Executive Board was conducted on February 17, 1978 at which time the Board voted against arbitration. Local 194 advised Mr. Foy of the results of the Board vote by letter of the same date. See Exhibit CP-10. The Charging Party argued that the February 17 letter was not postmarked until February 20, 1978. How- ever, an examination of the envelope shows two postmarks, the first of which was February 17, 1978
7/ Francis Forst, Business Manager of Local 194, as well as other union officials, testified that decisions of the Executive Board could be appealed to the membership as a whole (T. III, pp. 92-93; T. IV, p. 53). The Charging Party was asked whether he applied to the general membership to take his case to arbitration and he responded that he didn = t know (T. II, p. 67). When asked whether his attorney, Mr. Foy, had reviewed the union by-laws regarding arbitration, the Charging Party responded that he did (T. II, p. 67).
8/ Mr Zuccaro, Ms. Lacey, Mr. Minkel and Mr. Christiano all testified that they voted against taking the Charging Party = s grievance to arbitration because they believed it had little chance for success (T. IV, pp. 24, 47, 88, 128- 129).
9/ The collective agreement between the Authority and Local 194 provides in Article XVI that either an employee or the union can pursue a grievance at step one or step two of the grievance procedure. Article XVII, however, places a limi- tation on who can request arbitration:
In the event the decision of the Executive Director
is unsatisfactory, the union may submit the matter
to binding arbitration.
By letter dated March 7, 1978 (Exhibit CP-7) the Executive Director of the Authority responded to a letter by Mr. Foy on behalf of the Charging Party (Exhibit CP-6). Mr. Foy had requested arbitration of the Charging Party = s grievance and advised the Executive Director that the Charging Party was willing to bear the cost of the arbitration. The Executive Director responded to Mr. Foy = s request and indicated that arbitration must be submitted by the union, and he referred Mr. Foy to Article XVII. On that basis, the Executive Director denied the Charging Party = s request for arbitration.
10/ T. II, p. 132; T. III, p. 29.
11/ The Charging Party testified that he discussed the Fabrizi incident with his fellow workers (T. I, p. 39).
12/ Russell Anderson, Superintendent of Maintenance for the Authority, at T. II, p. 131; Joseph Hornblower, foreman, at T. III, pp. 109-110, 114; and Joseph Robertson, Deputy Executive Director of the Authority and the hearing officer at the Charging Party = s dismissal hearing, at T. IV, p. 225, testified that they did not know until recently that the Charging Party had been the one who reported Fabrizi.
13/ T. I, pp. 43, 47, 49.
14/ T. I, pp. 46-47.
15/ T. II, pp. 93, 115-116; T. III, p. 111.
16/ T. I, p.13.
17/ It appears to the undersigned that the Charging Party was also arguing that the actions of the Authority and Local l194 - when looked at together - combined to deny him of his rights. That argument is far different from the Charging Party = s assertion that the Authority improperly influenced the Local = s decision to deny his request for arbitration. A collusive relationship between the Authority and Local 194 to deprive the Charging Party of his right to file a grievance would be violative of the Act. But independent actions by the Authority and Local l94 that resulted in the same conclusion, i.e. , the denial of a request for arbitration, is not necessarily violative of the Act.
18/ In deciding the primary issues, there are three sub-issues that must be considered: (1) Whether the evidence established a collusive relationship between the Authority and Local 194 to deprive the Charging Party of his rights under the Act. (2) Whether Local 194 failed in its duty of fair representation toward the Charging Party in the conduct of the investigation and the hearing concerning his discharge. (3) Whether the Authority failed to process a grievance presented by Local 194.
19/ Finding of Fact No. 7.
20/ Amalgamated Assoc. of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Ees. of America v. Lockridge , 403 U.S. 274, 301, 77 LRRM 2501, 2512 (1971).
21/ Our Act does provide at N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 that: A When no majority representative has been selected as the bargaining agent for the unit of which an individual employee is a part, he may present his own grievance either personally or through an appropriate representative or an organization of which he is a member and have such grievance adjusted. @ However, in the instant matter there is a majority represen- tative therefore this provision does not apply. Neverthe- less, even if no majority representative had been present herein, the Charging Party did present his grievance to the Authority and a hearing was held concerning that matter. Therefore, that portion of the Act would have been satisfied.
22/ 78 N.J. at 137.
23/ 78 N.J . at 139. The Court in Red Bank, supra , hinted that it may be a violation of Section (a)(1) of the Act if an individual employee was prevented from presenting his grievance. In the instant matter, however, the Charging Party = s grievance was presented and he was in fact represented by the majority representative.